Vacuous names in early analytic philosophy:Frege, Russell, and Moore by Textor, Mark
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1111/phc3.12322
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Textor, M. (2016). Vacuous names in early analytic philosophy: Frege, Russell, and Moore. Philosophy
Compass, 11(6), 316-326. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12322
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
Vacuous Names In Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, and 
Moore  
 
1. Introduction: Vacuous Proper Names  
The founders of analytic philosophy – Frege, Russell, Moore – engaged with 
problems raised by vacuous names, and their thinking on this issue informed their 
views, and hence our views, of reference and communication. By working through 
the arguments of these philosophers I will introduce the reader to the main 
philosophical questions about vacuous proper names. I will start with Frege’s 
conception of vacuous names, move to Russell’s, and end with Moore, who aimed to 
solve the problem that vacuous names posed for Frege and Russell. 
What are vacuous proper names? In natural language there are type-
expressions that are designated to be used as names: ‘Fido’ is a typical name for a 
dog, ‘Sheba’ for a cat, ‘Anthony’ a first name for a boy that combines with a second 
name to form a proper name. Kaplan (108) calls such expressions ‘generic names’. As 
a first stab characterisation we can say that a vacuous name is a use of a generic name 
in which it has no referent. We need to appeal to the notion of a use of a generic name 
because, for instance, many people are called ‘James Bond’.1 Yet ‘James Bond’ also 
has a use in which it is empty. I will say more about uses of proper names as we go 
along. But for ease of exposition I will initially make the simplifying assumption that 
empty names are generic names that don’t refer. 
Why are vacuous names philosophically interesting? A theory of proper 
names should apply to non-vacuous as well as vacuous names. But vacuous proper 
names introduce special problems that make a unified theory difficult to achieve. As 
                                                        
1 See Dummett,’Existence’, 282. 
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an example, consider the question ‘When is a sentence of the form ‘N is F’ true?’ 
(where ‘N’ is a shorthand for a name). If we ignore vacuous names, it seems plausible 
to say that ‘N is F’ is true if the predicate ‘is F’ applies to the bearer of ‘N’ and false, 
if he predicate does not apply to it. Now the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ seems 
to be true and of the form ‘N is F’. But if the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ (in the use 
initiated by Conan Doyle) does not name anything, how can ‘Sherlock Holmes exist’ 
be false if we accept the account outlined? How can, in general, an assertion of an 
atomic sentence containing a vacuous name say something that is either true or false? 
A similar problem arises for communication. By saying ‘Aristotle is a 
philosopher’ you might communicate something that I did not know before: by 
accepting what you said I can extend my knowledge about Aristotle. Now, when you 
say ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ you may again communicate something that I 
did not know before. How is this possible if there is no Sherlock Holmes of whom 
you say something true?  
 
2. Gottlob Frege: Sense without Reference  
Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) developed his theory of sense and reference in his seminal 
article ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892). He argued that ‘Hesperus is the same planet 
as Hesperus’ is true and uninformative, while ‘Hesperus is the same planet as 
Phosphorus’ is true and can extend the knowledge of someone who accepts it. The 
difference between these sentences consists in the fact that the names express 
different senses, while they refer to the same object. He glossed the main ingredient 
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of sense as a mode of presentation. An assertoric sentence expresses a thought, a 
complex sense. A thought is a sense for which the question of truth (falsity) arises.2  
Prima facie, expressions can have sense, but no reference. Consider ‘Dr. 
Jekyll is no one other than Mr. Hyde’ and ‘Mr. Hyde is no one other than Mr. Hyde’. 
According to Stevenson’s novel, both sentences are true, but only the second can be 
accepted without further reason; whether it is true according to the novel is something 
one needs to find out. A plausible explanation for this difference is that ‘Dr. Jekyll’ 
and ‘Mr. Hyde’ express different modes of presentation. So there are different modes 
of presentation such that each present nothing, yet purport to present the same thing. 
Indeed Frege frequently asserted that sense is independent of reference: 
 
[T]he object designated by a proper name seems to be quite inessential to the 
thought content of a sentence which contains it. (‘Einleitung in die Logik’, 
208 [191].) 
 
Consider Frege’s letter to Russell: 
 
When we merely want to enjoy the poetry we do not care whether, e.g., the 
name “Ulysses” has a reference (or, as it is usually put, whether Ulysses was 
an historical personage). The question first acquires an interest for us when we 
take a scientific attitude – the moment we ask, “Is the story true?”, i.e., when 
we take an interest in the truth-value. In poetry too there are thoughts, but 
there are only mock assertions [Scheinbehauptungen]. This is also why a poet 
                                                        
2  Frege ‘Der Gedanke’, 60 [292]. References to English translations in square 
brackets. 
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cannot be accused of lying if he knowingly says something false in his poetry. 
(Frege, Briefwechsel, 235 [152]; my emphasis) 
 
Fictional discourse is constituted by mock assertions; scientific discourse (broadly 
construed) by assertions. By mock-asserting ‘Sherlock Holmes lives in Baker Street’ 
Doyle expressed a thought. If Doyle only mock-asserts that Sherlock Holmes lives in 
Baker Street, he does not present the thought expressed as true. The story-teller only 
intends that the sentences he utters has sense; whether the thought expressed is true or 
its constituent senses determine referents are irrelevant for his purpose.  
Frege also called vacuous proper names ‘Scheineigennamen’ (often translated 
as ‘mock proper name’): 
 
Names that miss the purpose which names usually have, namely to name 
something, could be called Scheineigenname. (‘Logik’, 141 [130]) 
 
‘Schein-’ is often used as a modifying expression. In one of its uses, ‘x is a Schein-F’ 
implies that x is not F. If ‘Scheineigenname’ worked like this, a Scheineigenname ‘N’ 
would not be a proper name.3 Frege’s terminology therefore invites an interpretation 
proposed by Kripke and, in part, developed by Evans: 
 
Frege is the first author I am aware of to have emphasised that empty names in 
fiction, and the sentences that contain them, are pretenses. (‘Vacuous Names 
and Fictional Entities’, 58. Fn.) 
 
                                                        
3 Kripke ‘Vacuous Names’, 58–9. 
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A Scheineigenname is an expression that we pretend (in a fiction) is a proper name. 
So there are no vacuous proper names, there are only expressions that we pretended 
are proper names. Frege said that an assertoric sentence s with a Scheineigenname 
expresses a Scheingedanke. If we apply the reasoning we used for Scheineigenname 
to Scheingedanke, the result is that s does not express a thought.4  
 Kripke’s interpretation may suggest a fruitful view of vacuous names in 
general and fictional proper names in particular. But it does not sit well with Frege’s 
texts, and nor does his explanation of Scheineigenname suggest Kripke’s reading.5 
Something can be an F even if it ‘misses the purpose’ that Fs usually have. The bike 
in my living room is still a bike although it misses its usual purpose: I just have it for 
decoration.6 Frege gives us no good reason to think that the author of a piece of 
fiction only pretends that, say, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a proper name and that ‘Sherlock 
Holmes was an easy man to live with’ expresses a thought. Rather, the author does 
not intend the thoughts he expresses to be believed. 
 After addressing this exegetical issue we can ask whether Frege has plausible 
answers to the questions about proper names raised in the introduction. 
First, negative existentials and truth. An assertoric sentence with a vacuous 
name is neither true nor false.7 If ‘Ulysses’ is vacuous, there is nothing the concept- 
word ‘ξ was set a shore in Ithaca’ (‘ξ’ marks the argument-place) can be true or false 
of and the sentence ‘Ulysses was set a shore in Ithaca’ is neither true nor false; in 
                                                        
4 See Kripke ‘Vacuous Names’, 59 and Evans, 285-6. ‘Vacuous Names’ is a potboiler 
of Kripke’s lectures that are now published as Reference and Existence. For critical 
discussion of Kripke’s view see Evans, 349ff and Salmon. 
5 See also Bell for further discussion. 
6 See Sainsbury, Reference without Referents, 93. 
7 See ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ 32-33 [214-5], ‘Logik’, 141 [130]. 
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Frege’s terminology: the sentence does not refer to a truth-value. Frege took existence 
to be a property of concepts, namely the property of having instances, ‘There is …’ 
refers to this property. If we want to deny that Apollo exists, the Fregean needs to say 
‘It is not the case that there is something identical with Apollo’. Since ‘Apollo’ is 
vacuous, there is nothing for the concept-word ‘It is not the case that there is 
something identical with ξ’ to be true of and the sentence is neither true nor false. But 
this is highly counter-intuitive. The sentence under consideration is true.  
Second, communication with vacuous names of natural languages. Frege 
wrote: 
 
The task of vernacular languages is essentially fulfilled if people engaged in 
communication with one another connect the same thought, or approximately 
the same thought, with the same sentence. (Frege, Briefwechsel, 183 [115], my 
emphasis) 
 
The task of natural languages is to enable communication, and if you and I connect 
the same thought with the sentence ‘Aristotle liked dogs’ we can communicate 
successfully: by uttering this sentence with assertoric force I can bring it about that 
you learn that Aristotle liked dogs. Why does Frege add ‘or approximately the same 
thought’ – that is, not the same thought?  
In general, the sense of a proper name varies from speaker to speaker or from 
time to time. For instance, while you may think of the bearer of ‘Aristotle’ as the 
pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great, I think of its bearer as the teacher 
of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. But: 
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So long as the referent remains the same, such variations of sense may be 
tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a 
demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a complete language. (Frege 
‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, 27 [210], Fn) 
 
One can read this as saying that A can communicate successfully with B by uttering 
‘Aristotle loved dogs’ only if A and B grasp modes of presentation that present 
Aristotle and predicate loving dogs of him. Referential similarity is close enough for 
successful communication in natural language, but not for giving proofs in Frege’s 
concept-script. 
Frege’s conception of communication with sentences containing names either 
(a) does not allow for communication with vacuous names or (b) requires that the 
sense of vacuous names does not vary. As we will see, (b) is implausible. Hence, 
Frege is left with (a). But can one not communicate something (true) by saying ‘It is 
not the case that there is something identical with Apollo’? 
In the next sections I will discuss Russell’s attempt to eliminate vacuous 
names. In section four we will see that the problem of communication also haunts 
Russell’s work. 
 
3. Meinong and Russell: Definite Descriptions and Non-Entities 
The Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) offered a simple answer to 
the question of how a negative existential statement or judgement can be true: 
 
In order to recognize that there is no round square I must indeed make a 
judgement about the round square (Meinong 1904, 9)  
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Meinong argued that the judgement that the round square does not exist constitutes 
knowledge. One can only make a judgement about the round square if there is a round 
square. Hence, the round square needs to exist in some sense. He concluded that there 
are things that subsist, but fail to exist.  
Russell (‘On Denoting’, 482–3) argued that Meinong’s theory violated the law 
of contradiction: if the round square subsists, it is round as well as square and 
consequently not round. This objection does not count against the being or 
subsistence of Sherlock Holmes and Apollo, since they have no contradictory 
properties. Nonetheless one of Russell’s aims was to provide a theory that does not 
postulate non-existing objects, yet allows sentences such as ‘The round square does 
not exist’ and ‘Apollo does not exist’ to be true.  
Russell’s strategy to achieve this aim was ‘to abandon the view that the 
denotation is what is concerned in propositions which contain denoting phrases’ (ibid, 
484). Denoting phrases are expressions such as ‘a man’, ‘some man’, ‘any man’. 
Definite descriptions are denoting phrase headed by the definite article ‘the’ (‘the 
author of Waverley’) or by expressions with the same semantic role (‘my only son’). 
The denotation of a definite description is the unique object that has the properties 
referred to by the general terms of the definite description. The denotation of, for 
instance, ‘the author of Waverley’ is the person who wrote Waverley: Sir Walter 
Scott. Sentences containing definite descriptions are not about or do not concern the 
object that is denoted by the definite description. In part, this means that they are 
meaningful and can be false and, in the case of negative existentials, true, 
independently of whether there is a denotation.  
Russell expounds his view of denoting phrases in general and definite 
descriptions in terms of meaning (ibid, 480ff). For example, a sentence such as ‘The 
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author of Waverley was Scottish’ means that there was one and only one entity x 
which wrote Waverley and x was Scottish. Hence, the sentence is true if, and only if, 
there was a unique author of Waverley and this author was Scottish; otherwise it is 
false. The sentence is meaningful and false independently of the existence of the 
denotation. Russell made this view of sentences with definite descriptions plausible 
by showing that it resolves three logical puzzles. The application to Meinong’s ‘The 
round square does not exist’ is straightforward: The sentence means that it is not the 
case that there is one and only one entity x which is round and square; there is indeed 
no unique round square. So the sentence is true. Russell got the truth-value of this and 
similar sentences right without positing non-entities because sentences with definite 
descriptions do not concern the denotation of these phrases. 
 
4. Russell and Whitehead: Vacuous and Ordinary Proper Names ‘are’ Definite 
Descriptions 
Sentences that contain definite descriptions are not concerned with the denotation of 
the definite descriptions contained. But one can run Meinong’s argument with a 
vacuous proper name: ‘Apollo does not exist’ is true. It can only be true if the bearer 
of ‘Apollo’ does not exist. Hence, ‘Apollo’ names something that subsists, but does 
not exist: a non-entity.  
Russell tried to block this argument by arguing that ‘Apollo’ is a denoting 
phrase: 
 
The whole realm of non-entities, such as “the round square”, “the even prime 
other than 2”, “Apollo,” and “Hamlet” can now be satisfactorily dealt with. 
All these are denoting phrases which do not denote anything. A proposition 
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about Apollo means what we get by substituting what the classical dictionary 
tells us is meant by Apollo, say “the sun-god”. All propositions in which 
Apollo occurs are to be interpreted by the above rule for denoting phrases. 
(‘On Denoting’, 491) 
 
Neither ‘Apollo’ nor ‘Hamlet’ are denoting phrases, they are proper names. But 
‘Apollo does not exist’ means it is not the case that there is one and only one entity x 
which is a sun-god. Given this meaning, the truth of ‘Apollo does not exist’ does not 
require the being of Apollo. Its truth requires only the existence of the properties 
mentioned in the Classical Dictionary under ‘Apollo’. 8 
 Russell and Whitehead (31) interpreted uses of proper names for objects 
‘known to the speaker only by report, and not by personal acquaintance’ by the rule 
for denoting phrases, that is, they took sentences containing such names to have 
meanings specifiable by the use of definite descriptions. Why? For any sentence that 
contains a proper name whose bearer we know only by report – I will call such proper 
names simply ‘ordinary proper names’ – one can suppose that there is no referent of 
the name. The reports that purport to impart information about a German politician 
going by the name ‘Otto von Bismarck’ may be false. If the sentence under 
consideration (‘Otto von Bismarck is a great statesman’) can be supposed to false 
because there is no such person as Otto von Bismarck’, ‘Otto von Bismarck’ cannot 
be a name (ibid, 69). For the meaning of a name is exhausted by the object it names 
and a sentence with a vacuous name would be neither true nor false. Hence, ‘Otto von 
                                                        
8 According to Russell’s view ‘Apollo exists’ is false (and its negation true) if, and 
only if, there are either several sun-gods or none. Moore (Lectures on Philosophy, 32) 
argued that the discovery of several sun-gods is not relevant for the the truth of 
‘Apollo exists’.  
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Bismarck is a great statesman’ means that there is one and only one entity x which is 
… and that entity is a great statesman. Considerations about the truth and 
meaningfulness of sentences with vacuous names drive Russell to interpret both 
vacuous and ordinary proper names according to the rule for denoting phrases.  
 
5. Russell on Communicating about Nothing 
According to Russell, there is an important difference between ‘Apollo’ on the one 
hand and ‘Otto von Bismarck’ on the other. There is no authority such as the classical 
lexicon we can consult to specify the definite description we mean when we use ‘Otto 
von Bismarck’. Russell (Problems of Philosophy, 29–30) and later Moore (Lectures, 
27, 29) took it to be an ‘obvious truth’ that the definite descriptions connected to 
proper names vary from speaker to speaker. Why? Russell (Problems, 30) argued that 
we only know that a definite description applies if it contains an expression referring 
to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted. One is acquainted with a 
particular if one is aware of it independently of knowing a truth about it. Such 
knowledge by acquaintance cannot be shared and therefore the knowledge that 
underpins the use of a proper name varies from speaker to speaker. For instance, Karl 
knows of Bismarck as the politician his father admired, Franz knew of him as the 
politician who gave a speech then. A proper name such as ‘Otto von Bismarck’ (even 
in the particular use as the name of the German politician), then, has no meaning in 
English.  
Do vacuous proper names differ in this respect from ordinary proper names? 
Russell’s remarks about ‘Apollo’ suggest that for some vacuous names there is a 
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particular set of definite descriptions that gives their meaning.9 Sainsbury provides a 
reason to take this suggestion seriously: Because there is, for example, no such person 
as Spiderman we cannot acquire different bodies of identifying information that are 
all connected to the name ‘Spiderman’. There is only one designated body of 
information, the descriptions given in the Marvel comics, on which we all must draw 
when using ‘Spiderman’.10 
Moore opposed this idea (he uses ‘exclusive description’ for a uniquely 
instantiated property): 
 
If you & I never think of Julius Caesar by the same exclusive descr., it’s quite 
certain that the properties by which you think of Apollo won’t be the same 
either. (Lectures, 30. See also ibid. 27) 
 
To make Moore’s point vivid, consider ‘Don Juan’. When I say ‘Don Juan does not 
exist’ I will substitute ‘the son of Donna Inez’ for ‘Don Juan’, while you substitute 
‘the master of Leporello’. We think of the same fictional character, but draw on 
knowledge of different works in which he figures. Just as a real object can give rise to 
different bodies of identifying knowledge, the same fictional character can be 
developed in different works and ‘its’ name can be associated with different definite 
descriptions. Moreover, the definite descriptions that articulate the thought a speaker 
expresses by ‘Apollo exists’ will frequently not draw on the classical lexicon: By 
                                                        
9 See also Lewis, 267 who also suggests that a fictional proper name is ‘very unlike’ a 
non-vacuous proper name. 
10  See ‘Russell on Names and Communication’, 96. In the footnote on the same page 
Sainsbury backtracks from the view proposed. 
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saying ‘Apollo exists’ I mean that the God I admire most exists. This further opens 
the door for variation of description in the case of mythical and fictional names. 
For this reason vacuous and non-vacuous names are in the same boat: there is, 
in general, no privileged set of description that gives the meaning of the name. If there 
is no such set, the view Russell proposed is not a view of the meaning of sentences 
with proper names. It is a view of the ‘thought in the mind of a person using a proper 
name correctly’ (Russell, Problems, 29). 11 Such a thought, Russell holds, can only be 
fully specified if we replace the proper name by a definite description. For example, 
by asserting the sentence ‘Otto von Bismarck was a great politician’, Karl makes his 
belief manifest that the man his father admired was a great politician; by asserting 
the same sentence, Jeffrey voices his belief that the man in whose honor the Bismarck 
herring was named is a great politician. Karl and Jeffrey use the same words and 
denote the same things, but seem to talk cross-purpose. If this is so, how do we 
communicate with proper names?  
 
What enables us to communicate in spite of varying descriptions we employ is 
that we know that there is a true proposition concerning the actual Bismarck, 
and that however we may vary the description (so long as the description is 
correct) the proposition described is still the same. (Problems, 31) 
 
The utterer of ‘Otto von Bismarck was a great politician’ cannot expect her audience 
to use this sentence with the same descriptive meaning as she herself. She and her 
audience know that Bismarck is ‘different things to different people’. However, while 
speaker and audience will think thoughts specifiable by different definite descriptions, 
                                                        
11 See Sainsbury ‘Russell on Names and Communication’, 87-88. 
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communication is achieved if their different definite descriptions denote the same 
person, the predicate attributes the same property, and both speaker and audience 
know that this is so. 12 
 Now consider again a vacuous name like ‘Apollo’. Different people have 
different definite descriptions in mind when using the name; none of them denote 
anything. If the definite descriptions of speaker and hearer don’t denote at all, they a 
fortiori don’t denote the same thing. Hence, the enabling condition for 
communication is not met.  
To summarize: Russell answered to the question ‘What does a vacuous name 
mean in an utterance by a speaker?’ by appeal to the theory of definite descriptions. 
His answer allowed him to classify ‘Apollo does not exist’ as true. But it motivated a 
view of communication that made communication with vacuous names impossible. In 
essence, he faced the same problem as Frege before him and, like Frege before him, 
he solved it. 
In light of this problem, Evans and McDowell rejected the intuition that 
utterances with empty proper names can be understood in a sense that makes for 
intellectual engagement. Evans (Varieties, 336) argues that there are no plausible 
conditions for understanding utterances with empty proper names. There is only an 
illusion of communication and understanding of sentences containing ‘Apollo’, etc.13 
I take this to be a last resort proposal. In the next section we will see whether Moore 
made any progress with this problem. 
 
6. Moore on Thinking about the Same Imaginary Object 
                                                        
12 Sainsbury (‘Russell on Names and Communication’, 91) calls this the ‘description 
theory of communication’ and clarifies its main points in detail. 
13 On illusions of understanding, see Sainsbury Reference without Referents, 88f. 
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In order to apply Frege and Russell’s theories of communication to vacuous names 
one needs an account of what it is to think ‘of the same non-existent object’ that 
neither requires non-entities nor shared definite descriptions. Moore tried to provide 
such an account. 
 So when do we think of when we say we think about ‘the same imaginary 
object’ if there is no such thing to think about? Moore (Lectures, 33) started with an 
example. A writer begins a novel by saying ‘Mr Smith was going down, etc.’ He 
pretends that we are already able to use the name and come to understand that Mr 
Smith was going down, etc. But: 
 
[w]hat actually happens is merely that you’re led to conceive the hypothesis 
that there was someone or other called Mr. Smith to whom certain things 
happened. (ibid.) 
 
When do you think of the same imaginary person as the story-teller? Prima facie, one 
wants to say that the property that figures in your hypothesis that there is someone 
called Mr. Smith who did P must be similar to the property or properties that feature 
in the writer’s hypothesis. This similarity-condition takes Frege and Russell’s 
observation that different people think of the same thing differently on board. The 
author’s and my hypotheses may differ. Yet there are constraints on the variation of 
definite description that are determined by the context and purpose of the 
conversation. When discussing Greek mythology, for example, the speaker as well as 
the hearer should conceive of hypotheses that involve properties like being a God of 
music, a God of medicine, etc, although they don’t need to conceive of the same 
hypothesis. 
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However, while necessary, this is not a sufficient condition. When Conan 
Doyle wrote the Sherlock Holmes stories he conceived of a property – being an 
eccentric detective who lives in Baker Street 221b and goes by the name ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ – and entertain the hypothesis that someone had it. I might independently 
conceive of the same property and conceive of the same hypothesis. In this situation 
Doyle and I don’t conceive of the same fictional character, but we come up with two 
different, but very similar characters (Lectures, 29, 34).  
The example suggests a further necessary condition for thinking ‘of the same 
imaginary object’: my conceiving of the hypothesis that someone or other is P 
depends on your conceiving of the hypothesis that someone or other is P. Moore 
spelled out ‘depends on’ in terms of causation. There is a common causal source of 
both conceivings.14 
Finally, the object thought about is an imaginary object only if the causal 
source of the conceivings is not knowledge that there is an object that satisfies the 
description. 
According to Moore (Lectures, 36), these necessary conditions are jointly 
sufficient for thinking of ‘the same imaginary object’. This yields a solution to the 
problem that vacuous names posed for Russell’s description theory of 
communication: ‘What enables different speakers to communicate with vacuous 
proper names in spite of varying descriptions they employ’ is that they can think of 
‘the same imaginary object’ when using such names. For example, I can communicate 
with you by uttering ‘Apollo does not exist’ because we can both ‘think of Apollo’ 
and entertain thoughts to the effect that he does not exist. While this may sound 
                                                        
14 The idea of causation figures prominently (though under different labels) in recent 
work. Representative examples are Sainsbury Reference without Referents and Friend.  
 17 
paradoxical, we can spell Moore’s idea out without assuming the existence of a non-
entity: when uttering ‘Apollo does not exist’ I intend you to conceive of a hypothesis 
that there is someone or other who is P such that this hypothesis is similar to the one I 
conceive when making the utterance. If your conceiving is either caused by my 
conceiving or our conceivings have the same causal source, I have communicated 
successfully to you. In virtue of my belief that it is not the case there is someone or 
other who is P you come to believe that it is not the case that there is someone or 
other who is Q where Q is sufficiently like my P. In this picture there is not the 
proposition that is communicated, but the ‘unit’ of communication is a set or 
collection of similar propositions. 
Moore’s picture of communication is also plausible for non-vacuous names. 
Imagine that two isolated hermits have given the same object, the evening star, the 
same (typo-graphically individuated) name, ‘Venus’, and even connected the same 
definite description with it. Do the hermits successfully communicate when they meet 
for the first time and one utters the sentence ‘Venus is a planet’? One feels that the 
answer is NO. They talk past each other, but are lucky in getting the reference right.  
What is missing for successful communication is the right kind of dependence 
between their conceivings.15 
Moore made progress with the problems that arose for Frege and Russell. 
Now, for Moore’s account to be defensible causal coordination should ensure that the 
coordinated conceivings are ‘about the same object’. But prima facie, there are uses 
of the same name that have a common cause and yet refer to different objects. There 
is a causal chain between uses of ‘Madagascar’ for Mogadishu and ‘Madagascar’ for 
                                                        
15 See Sainsbury, ‘Sense without Reference’, 215-6 for further discussion. 
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the Island on the African coast.16 Similarly, my conceiving of the hypothesis that 
someone or other did P may cause your conceiving of the same hypothesis, yet we 
think of different objects. I merely imagined that someone or other did P; you were 
indirectly caused by my conceiving to conceive of the same hypothesis, but you came 
to believe it because you came to know that there is someone who did P. In this 
situation it seems plausible to say that we don’t think about the same imaginary 
object. For while I think about an imaginary object, you think about a real object. 
Mooreans need to find a more specific causal or dependence relation to support their 
view. 
 
7. Moore on Fictional Names and Reference-Repugnancy 
Could ‘Mr. Pickwick’, in the use initiated by Dickens, turn out to be the name of a 
real person? If sentences of the form ‘Mr. Pickwick ….’ in Dickens’s mouth mean 
that there is some person or other going by the name ‘Mr Pickwick’ who did …, the 
answer is ‘Yes’. It is highly improbable, but there might be a person x who goes by 
the name ‘Mr Pickwick’ who had done all the things Dickens’s purported to assert 
about Mr. Pickwick. But even in the situation described, most will agree, ‘Mr. 
Pickwick’, in the use initiated by Dickens, does not refer to x. It is just a coincidence 
that there is a man like the man described by Dickens.17 
 Why does ‘Mr Pickwick’ not refer to the real-life Mr Pickwick? 
 
Dickens’s propositions are all of the form “There was only one man of whom 
                                                        
16 See Evans, ‘Causal Theory’, 196. 
17 See ‘Imaginary Objects’, 113; Kripke ‘Vacuous Names’, 56 and Lewis, 265 on 
coincidental truth. 
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it’s true both that I’m telling you of him and that, etc. etc.” And ex hypothesi 
no proposition would be true about the man in question [the real man of whom 
everything related of Mr. Pickwick in the novel was true], since Dickens was 
not telling us of him: that is what is meant by saying that it is only “by 
coincidence” that there happened to be such a man. (‘Imaginary Objects’, 113) 
 
Telling someone is speaking from knowledge (Lewis 276). Dickens does not speak 
from knowledge; he has no knowledge about a certain Mr. Pickwick, he only purports 
to have it. Hence, the author-reflexive definite description ‘the man I am telling you 
about …’ does not have a real object.18  
However, Moore’s appeal to an author-reflexive property is independently 
implausible: 
First, if Dickens asserts that there was a man about whom he tells us and that 
his name was ‘Pickwick’ etc., he knowingly says something false. How can Moore 
then ensure that authors of fiction are not liars or at least deceivers? Frege’s view 
seems to have an advantage here, for he takes the author to only make mock-
assertions. 
Second, requirements for understanding fictional and non-fictional names turn 
out to be different: 
 
The historian writing about Napoleon is not always referring to him as the 
man, having such and such characters, about whom I’m telling this story, but 
as the man, having such and such characters, who was in such and such a place 
                                                        
18 Currie (474ff) argues that it is not the author but the story-teller, another fictional 
character that purports to tell the story. On Moore’s anticipation of Lewis and Currie, 
see Baldwin, 186. 
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at such and such a time. (‘Imaginary Objects’, 114) 
 
This is implausible: My understanding of the name ‘Mr. Pickwick’ is not impaired if I 
don’t know whether there is a story about him or not. 
 Can one do better? Dummett gives an alternative account of the reference-
repugnancy of fictional names that explains it in terms of the relation between the 
origination of the name and its later correct uses (‘Existence’, 282, 300). The manifest 
intention of the originator of the use of a proper name determines when use one uses 
it correctly. When it comes to a fictional name like ‘Mr Pickwick’ the name was 
introduced as the name of a fictional character and only uses of the name with the 
intention to conform to the author’s intention are correct.19 If one uses ‘Mr Pickwick’ 
for the real person one does not use it in the way Dickens manifestly intended.20  
Dummett’s proposal implies that the author must manifestly intend to use a 
name as a name of fictional character. The phrase ‘as a name of a fictional character’ 
cries out for further analysis. But the main problem is the manifest intention that is 
supposed to determine correct use. Compare the fictional name ‘Mr Pickwick’ and the 
hoax name ‘Ern Malley’, a name that purports to refer to a poet, in this respect. In the 
second case there is no manifest intention to refer to a ‘fabricated’ figure. It is 
precisely the point of the hoax that one can understand and use the name without 
realizing that it ‘names a non-existent’. Nonetheless a particular use of ‘Earn Malley’ 
is instigated and this use the name cannot refer to a real person. 
 
8. Conclusion 
                                                        
19 Dummett, ‘Could there be Unicorns?’ 333-4. 
20 Dummett, ‘Existence’, 300. 
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My aim in this paper was to articulate the problems that a theory of proper names that 
applies to vacuous as well as non-vacuous names must answer by drawing on the 
work of Frege, Russell and Moore. It turned out that the hardest problem is the 
possibility of communication with vacuous names. This problem will merit further 
investigation.21  
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